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TERENCE M. LANE*
I
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
The British Constitution is founded on the theory of the supremacy of Parliament.
The doctrine of the separation of powers is recognized, but not in the form applicable
in the United States which gives to the courts the power to limit the scope of the
legislature if an enactment is not in conformity with the Constitution. The United
Kingdom does not have a comprehensive written constitution, but if it had, the most
significant clause would be that which gives to Parliament the power, at least in
theory, to legislate both in the criminal and in the civil field without restriction. In
other words, in the United Kingdom there is no judicial review of legislation other
than to construe Parliament's intention'. The courts can of course intervene if exec-
utive action goes beyond the scope of'a statute or if executive powers are exercised
in a manner not reasonably contemplated by the statute, but this is a check on the
executive, not on the legislature.
The theory propounded by Dicey of the absolute supremacy of Parliament in
the legislative field has been encroached upon by convention'. The best-known
example is probably to be found in the Statute of Westminster1 passed in' 1931 by
which in practice Parliament bound itself not to legislate for Commonwealth coun-
tries except with their consent. There are many other examples to be found in
treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party and which effectively limit the free-
dom of Parliament to legislate in the field with which they are concerned. However,
the form of Parliamentary supremacy is nevertheless retained even in this field, since
treaties themselves do not have the force of law in the U.K. until they are ratified
by Parliament. According to Dicey's theory, the Statute of Westminster could not
bind succeeding Parliaments, but all subsequent Parliaments accept the fact that they
could not revoke the Statute of Westminster. Nevertheless, it must be recognized
that conventions do not have the force of law and, according to the doctrine of
Parliamentary supremacy, could be terminated by legislation which permits of no
other interpretation than that it is intended to overthrow the convention. The
English courts will obviously avoid concluding that such is the intention of the
legislation if they can possibly do so.
* Solicitor, Baker & McKenzie, London.
' Statute of Westminster, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, C. 4-
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A. Community Law Becomes British Law
In order to harmonize English and Community law, Parliament passed the Eu-
ropean Communities Act, 1972. This legislation enables the United Kingdom to
comply with the obligations entailed by and rights derived from membership in the
European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).
Under the Act, the existing Community treaties and regulations are automatically
incorporated into British law. Future Community law will also be absorbed into
domestic law. Thus, all rights and obligations "provided for by or under the
Treaties are, without further enactment to be given legal effect in the United
Kingdom." Hereafter, when a point arises in an English court to which a Com-
munity treaty or regulation is pertinent, the English court will interpret and apply
the proper Community law.2
In situations where Community law and previously enacted British law conflict,
the provisions of the Community treaties and regulations will take precedence. This
is clear, even on the principal of Parliamentary sovereignty, because the European
Communities Act which gives effect to Community law supersedes the earlier acts
to the extent that it is inconsistent with them. The fascinating questions for con-
stitutionalists are what result should ensue and what will be reaction of our national
courts if the enabling Act is followed by another Parliamentary act and the latter act
is then followed by Community regulations which are inconsistent with it. The con-
stitutional argument runs as follows-the second act must be deemed to repeal the
power of the enabling European Communities Act to authorize the inconsistent
regulations, so that according to the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty the later
act would prevail over the Community regulations. However, the English courts
are bound to hold that Community regulations override conflicting domestic legisla-
tion. In effect, -the judiciary would be limiting the powers of the legislature-
ostensibly for the first time in British constitutional history.
The most probable result is that the British courts will avail themselves of all the
long-developed techniques of statutory interpretation favoring the maintenance of
international treaty obligations and that they would resolve the inconsistency in
favor of the Community regulations by an appropriate interpretation of the legislation
in question. Without doubt, the British courts will be quick to identify and acknowl-
edge as a convention of the constitution that the British Parliament will not pass
legislation which is contrary to Community law, and they will construe such legisla-
tion' in the light of that convention.
With regard to the interpretation of words or phrases in a particular Community
treaty or regulation which an English court is seeking to apply in a case before it,
interpretive rulings solely as to the wording are available (but not mandatory unless
'Denning, Every Resource and Skill Needed in Grafting New Laws on to the Old, The Times (Lon-
don), Jan. 2, 1973, Special Report at 1H, col. z.
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it is an unclear passage and before a court of last resort) from the European Court
in Luxembourg. As to the disposition of the case itself, the English court shall make
its own decision 3
The Community treaties already in force among the member states total 115.
The Act describes two procedures relating to Community treaties. Those concluded
between Community institutions, which have automatic effect in the member states,
obviously cannot be varied or brought into force by Parliament because such Parlia-
mentary action in relation to a treaty which is self-executing in the United Kingdom
would be entirely superfluous. Indeed, it would be antipathetic to the supranational
character of Community law. However, Parliament, in relation to such treaties,
may by Order in Council declare them to be "Community Treaties" so that every-
body, including the courts which must give effect to the Community law, knows that
the provisions of such treaties have effect as law within the United Kingdom.
The second procedure applies to treaties to which the United Kingdom becomes
a party after Accession. In such cases, the treaty does not become a "Community
Treaty" unless a draft Order in Council specifying the treaty as a Community treaty
is approved by affirmative resolution of both Houses of Parliament.
Although ultimately the European Communities Bill reached its third reading
and was enacted without amendment, numerous disabling amendments were proposed
during its discussion. A number of Members of Parliament were particularly con-
cerned with the automatic incorporation of future Community law into British law.
They feared that far reaching changes could be effected under future Community
treaties with no more Parliamentary control than is achieved by the affirmative
resolution procedure of debate on an Order in Council. A debate on an Order
in Council is normally limited to one and a half hours, although there are Parlia-
mentary procedures for extending the time allowed. The discussion centered around
removing from the Order in Council procedure certain kinds of future Community
treaties so as to enable Parliament to exercise greater control over future develop-
ments of Community policy, without (according to the supporters of amendments
to this effect) in any way disenabling the Government from fulfilling its obligations
under the Treaty of Accession.
The Solicitor General used the following arguments against the amendments in
question-first, that the affirmative resolution procedure on Orders in Council
does in fact enable either House to block a development if it does not like it; second,
the scope of some of the treaties would be slight or very technical in their effect
and Parliament would not want to be cluttered up with full scale legislation on
such matters; third, any new Community treaty falling within the affirmative
resolution procedure on an Order in Council would have to be "ancillary" to an
existing Community treaty and, according to the Solicitor General, the word ancillary
is likely to be given a narrow and not a broad definition, so that radical changes
' Id. at Col 3 & 4.
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could not be initiated under the Order in Council procedure; and fourth, nothing
in the Bill would prevent a future Government from adopting the full legislative
procedure to approve a treaty in any given case if it decided that it was proper
in all the circumstances to do so.
The Government used the "ancillary" argument in order to defeat an amend-
ment proposed by the Opposition, the purpose of which was to prevent the EEC
turning itself into a defense community without the necessity for full legislative
procedure in the British Parliament. Sir Geoffrey Rippon4 pointed out that such a
fundamental change in the nature of the EEC could not possibly be deemed to be
ancillary to existing treaties and therefore would not fall within the Order in Council
procedure. However, Mr. Rippon was obviously loathe to use the same argument in
dealing with an Opposition amendment designed to prevent the Community
from establishing a monetary union with a common currency without the full legis-
lative procedure of the British Parliament. It can, therefore, be presumed that in his
,view such a treaty would be "ancillary" to the Treaty of Rome and could be dealt
with by the Order in Council procedure. The Government suggested that an ad hoc
committee should be set up in order to decide which new treaties deserve full
Parliamentary legislative procedure and which can be dealt with by Order in
Council, but the Opposition took the view that the establishment of such a com-
mittee is merely a ruse designed to distract attention from the inadequacy of the
European Communities Act, and accordingly refused to participate in any such com-
mittee.
Aside from the issue of procedure in respect of Community treaties to which
the United Kingdom is a party, it should be noted that the Community can conclude
treaties with other states or international organizations which will be binding on the
United Kingdom as a member of the Community but to which the United Kingdom
itself will not be a party. Such treaties, negotiated by the Commission and con-
cluded by the Council after consultation with the Assembly, have binding effect
under Rule 228( 3 ) of the Rome Treaty on all Community institutions and member
states.
B. Loss of Parliamentary Sovereignty
Critics of the Act point out that not only is there an abdication of sovereignty
by the British Parliament to the Community's organs in Brussels-which is, of
course, a necessary result of acceptance of the Treaty of Rome-but that this legisla-
tion produces an abridgement of Parliament's powers or at least an abridgement of
normal Parliamentary procedures when consideration is given to new legislation inr
respect of future developments in the Common Market. In this respect, there was
some criticism even from supporters of the Government of the manner in which
new developments in Community law would be dealt with. Perhaps the most telling
'The primary British EEC negotiator, he was asked to organize the legislative action for the
necessary harmonization of British and Community law.
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criticism was that which came from Mr. Enoch Powell5 when he refuted the Solicitor
General's argument that future Governments would, in appropriate cases, elect to
proceed by full legislation rather than by Order in Council. Mr. Powell stated that
unless legislation was rendered necessary by the form of the Act, there would be no
legislation. According to him, a Government which can do something by affirmative
resolution on an Order in Council will always do it by such resolution if it can get
a majority of one in the division lobby.
Unquestionably, some degree of sovereignty has been ceded. However, it remains
as yet unclear exactly how much is lost. That assessment will have to be made in
the days that follow. In making any evaluations it should be kept in mind that future
Community decisions will be made with no little amount of British influence.
Britain as a member state is now represented on the decision-making Council of
Ministers and the Commission.' The Government counters the constitutional argu-
ment with the assertion that rather than a situation of foreign-forged Community
regulations being thrown at a powerless British Parliament, the impact of Par-
liament's viewpoints will be widened to a new scope by virtue of British influence
on the decision-making in Brussels.
II
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS
One of the areas in which the implications of British entry into the Common
Market are of considerable interest to the lawyer, particularly one practicing in
the company and commercial field, is that of monopolies and restrictive trade prac-
tices. To appreciate the implications, it is necessary briefly to examine the present
English law of restrictive trade practices and monopolies.
An' American audience may be surprised to learn that the law in question is recent
-all of the statutes have been passed since the Second World War-and, by com-
parison with U.S. legislation, lenient in its provisions and certainly in its sanctions-
or rather the lack of them. The statutes in question are the Monopolies Act of
I9487 and the brief Amending Act of 1953,s the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of
I956,' the Resale Price Maintenance Act of 1964,1° the Monopolies & Mergers Act
of 1965,11 and the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of I968.'
Under the Monopolies Acts, a Commission was appointed by the Board of Trade,
the function of which is to examine monopoly situations and proposed mergers
'Mr. Powell is a conservative member of Mr. Heath's party.
0On the thirteen-member Commission, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy each have two repre-
sentatives. The smaller states each have one.
"Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 66.
'Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act of 1953, I & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 51.
' British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, 4 & 5 EliZ. 2, c. 68.
0 Resale Prices Act, c. 58 (1964).
"Monopolies and Mergers Act, c. 50 (1965).
"
2 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, c. 66 (1968).
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and to report to Parliament its views as to whether such monopolies or mergers
might be expected to operate against the public interest. So far as concerns
mergers, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) may refer an intended merger
to the Commission if as a result of the merger control over one-third of the relevant
market will pass into the hands of one company or group. The Acts apply to
the provision of both goods and services. The DTI may also refer a merger to the
Commission if the value of assets taken over exceeds 5,000,000 pounds or approx-
imately $13,000,000. Special restrictions apply to newspaper mergers involving
newspaper proprietors having a daily circulation of over 5oo,ooo, whether before
or after the proposed merger.
Two points should be emphasized in relation to this legislation. First, the criterion
of control is not the clear and straightforward one to be found in the U.K. Com-
panies Act---namely, the power to exercise voting control as a shareholder or to
appoint a majority of the Board of Directors of the company-but includes the
rather indefinite power "materially to influence the policy of a body corporate"
without having a legal controlling interest. Secondly, there is no very clear definition
in the statutes as to the relevant market, merely to "goods of any description," and
so it is left very much to the discretion of the Department of Trade and Industry
as to how they will define the goods in respect of which a monopoly situation
may be created. Thus, it would be theoretically possible for the DTI to refer a
proposed merger between two machine tool manufacturers to the Monopolies Com-
mission for investigation, not because together they controlled one-third or more
of the market in machine tools, but because they controlled one-third or more of
the market in a particular category of machine tools.
In passing, it should be made clear that relatively few cases have in fact been
referred to the Monopolies Commission and most of these have been approved.
In some cases, the Commission has relied on somewhat informal undertakings given
by the companies concerned which would, perhaps, surprise a student of U.S. antitrust
law. Thus, when the British Motor Corporation (now British Leyland Motor
Corporation) took over Pressed Steel Company Limited, which was the source of
most of the car bodies used in the U.K. automobile industry, the Commission ac-
cepted undertakings from BMC and Pressed Steel to the effect that present customers
of Pressed Steel would continue to receive from them the same supplies as in
the past and to the extent necessary to ensure continuity of their future require-
ments, despite the fact. that those very customers were BMC's biggest competitors.
The Commission stated that it was satisfied that such undertakings would be
honored "throughout the foreseeable future."
However, the biggest drawback in a merger situation arising from the x965
legislation is that if a merger is to take place at all, it should take place quickly.
"sThe Companies Act, II & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38 (1948).
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Normally, the proposed purchaser cannot afford to wait for up to six months while
the Commission deliberates on its report and reaches its findings.
The present U.K. Restrictive Trade Practices legislation also has its unusual
features, at least to an American audience. The first Act, passing in 1956, provided
that particulars of restrictive agreements between persons carrying on business in the
United Kingdom should be registered with the Registrar of Restrictive Trade
Practices. A separate Court, the Restrictive Practices Court, was set up to make
judicial investigations of restrictive trading agreements. However, there was a
significant omission in the Act. Although it required parties to a restrictive agree-
ment to register, it imposed no sanction whatsoever if they failed to do so. Not
surprisingly, the Act was largely ignored and I think it is accurate to say that the
only area in which it has had significant effect is where restrictive agreements have
been entered into by trade associations and like bodies. The 1968 Act provided that
restrictive agreements which were not registered would be void (which was a
feature missing from the 1956 Act) and that it was unlawful for any person who
was a party to the agreement to give effect to the restrictive provisions. However,
it then went on to say that no criminal proceedings should lie against any person
on account of a contravention of this provision but that the obligation not to give
effect to the restrictions was to be considered as a statutory duty owed to any
person who might be affected by their implementation. In other words, a person
injured as a result of the enforcing of the restrictions is entitled to sue the parties
to the agreement for breach of a statutory duty or the commission of a statutory tort.
Again, to lawyers who have practiced in the U.S. antitrust field, this must seem a
very mild sanction compared with those in force under U.S. legislation and par-
ticularly to the remedies available in the U.S. to persons injured by restrictive prac-
tices, such as the treble damage suit.
Section 8 of the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act exempts from registration
patent licenses so long as the restrictions in question relate to the invention to which
the patent refers or articles made by the use of the invention. It also exempts from
registration trademark licenses so long as the restrictions apply only to the goods
bearing the trademark or to the process of manufacture to be applied to goods
bearing the trademark. The same exemption applies to exchange of know-how
and to licenses under registered designs. Thus, in the industrial property field, there
is a complete exemption from registration of restrictive trading agreements so long
as the restrictions in question fall within the ambit of the particular monopoly
under consideration, whether it be a patent, a trademark, a registered design, or
secret processes and know-how.
There are other escape clauses in both the 1956 and the 1968 Restrictive Trade
Practices Acts. The most important are those to be found in Section 21 of the
earlier Act under which the Restrictive Trade Practices Court is bound to consider
a restriction contrary to the public interest unless it is satisfied of one or more of
the following:
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(a) that the restriction is necessary for the protection of the public against
injury;
(b) that the removal of the restriction would deny the public specific and
substantial benefits;
(c) that the restriction is necessary to counter measures-by persons who are not
parties to the restrictive agreement-which are themselves aimed at pre-
venting or restricting competition;
(d) that the restriction is necessary to enable the parties to the restrictive agree-
ment to negotiate fair terms with another person who controls a pre-
dominant part of the market;
(e) that the removal of the restriction would increase unemployment;
(f) that the removal of the restriction would reduce exports;
(g) that the restriction is merely ancillary to and is required to maintain in
force any other restriction found by the Court not to be contrary to the
public interest;
The 1968 Act added a further reason for considering a restriction not contrary
to the public interest, namely, that it does not materially discourage competition.
The primary object of this new defense was to protect harmless information
agreements which could not qualify under any of the existing seven escape clauses.
The 1968 Act also exempted from registration certain agreements to be approved
by the Board of Trade regarded as of importance to the national economy, such
as those designed to create or improve productive capacity, but the Board of Trade
is not entitled to approve such agreements unless the restrictions are necessary for
the achievement of the particular object of national importance. The Act also
exempts from registration agreements which are designed to hold down prices, but
these must be approved by certain designated competent authorities such as the
Board of Trade, the Minister of Agriculture, or the Minister of Health. Such
approval may only continue in force for a maximum of two years.
It may be stated that parties to proceedings before the Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Court have found it difficult in practice to satisfy the Court that they are
entitled to the benefit of one or more of the exemptions under Section 21 of the
1956 Act and that, therefore, their agreement is not against the public interest. Even
where the result of the agreement has been the achievement of one or more of the
benefits set out in the Section, the Court has sometimes decided that the restriction
is not essential for the achievement of such benefit.
However, there have been one or two surprising cases. For instance, the principal
manufacturers of black bolts and nuts formed an association called, perhaps not
surprisingly, the Black Bolt and Nut Association, and adopted rules which required
the members -to sell their products to "ordinary users" at the prices set out in the
Association's price list and to report to the Association prices they proposed to charge
to larger users such as Government departments, railways, harbor boards, and the
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like. 4 After days of argument, the Court held that the ordinary user restriction con-
ferred a specific and substantial benefit on the public because it saved purchasers
the extra administrative expense of "going shopping!" It decided against the "larger
user" restriction, but when the Association amended the "larger user" restriction so
as to provide that members could only quote a reduced price for non-standard bolts
and nuts. If a reduction in costs of production was achieved, the Court approved
the restriction as being reasonably required for the maintenance of the ordinary
user restriction which they had found to confer a benefit on the public, since they
felt that maintenance of the ordinary user restriction would not continue if mem-
bers could reduce prices to certain categories of larger customers. They did, how-
ever, require the Secretary of the Association not to pass on immediately to members
paticulars of cut prices to large users so that the other members could not use the
reduced prices when making their own tenders or offers.
Before leaving this brief review of restrictive practices legislation under English
law, mention should be made of Section 57 of the Patents Act of i94918 which is
designed to prevent abuse of monopoly where patents are concerned. It has
the effect of prohibiting conditions in patent licenses which restrict the licensee
from acquiring non-patented articles except from the patentee or his nominee,
or which prohibit or restrict the licensee from using articles or processes not belong-
ing to the licensor. The sanction against such conditions in patent licenses is a
very real one, since for all practical purposes the patent itself is invalidated during
the continuance of any such condition. However, this effective restriction on abuse
of monopoly has been somewhat eroded by the decision of the House of Lords in
Tool Metal Manufacturing Company v. Tungsten Electric Company Limited,"
where the Court held that the imposition of a monetary penalty in the form of
increased royalties to deter a licensee from acquiring products from third parties
did not "prohibit or restrict" him even though the monetary deterrent was a thirty
per cent royalty.
Turning now to the situation in the antitrust field in the Common Market,
it will be seen that this is markedly different from that which exists in the United
Kingdom. In the first place, there are real sanctions which may be imposed for
breach of the Common Market antitrust laws. In the decision of the Commission
prohibiting the International Quinine Cartel,' 7 fines were imposed totalling approx-
imately $5oo,ooo on the six companies involved, one company alone suffering a fine
of $2ioooo. In the decision prohibiting the Dyestuff Manufacturers Cartel,'" fines
"'In re Black Bolt and Nut Association's Agreement, [ig6o] L.R. 2 R.P. 50.
21 Patents Act of 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 87.
"Tool Metal Mfg. Co. v. Tungsten Elec. Co., [1955] 1 W.L.R. 761 (H.L.).
17 Quinine Cartel [New Developments Apr., 1965-Dec., z969 Transfer Binder] CCH CoL. MKr. REP.
9313 (1969); 2 CCH Comm. MvKT. REP. 9484 (971).
"I Dyestuffs Cartel [New Developments Apr., 1965-Dec., 1969 Transfer Binder] CCHI Comm.r. M.T.
RaP. 93r4 (1969); 2 CCH Comm. Mr. RP. t9397 (1970).
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were imposed totalling $490,000, including fines on companies incorporated outside
the Common Market in' Switzerland and Great Britain.
Secondly, the exemptions available under British restrictive trade practices legisla-
tion for the exercise of industrial property rights do not apply to Articles 85 and 86
of the Rome Treaty.'9 In fact, the development of Community law in respect of the
interplay between industrial property rights and the rules of competition of the EEC
has been, and remains, one of the most fascinating aspects of the Community legal
scene. When the Community first came into existence, there was much speculation
as to the effect that the rules designed to free competition and remove trade bar-
riers might have on industrial property rights. Commentators, including myself,
pointed out that Article 22 of the Treaty provided that it would in no way
prejudice the system existing in member states in respect to property, and of course,
industrial property such as trademarks, patents, copyright, and registered designs
is as much property as any other kind. It was also pointed out that Article 36
of the Treaty states that provisions of the Treaty designed to eliminate quantitative
restrictions between member states were not to prevent prohibitions or restrictions
justified on the grounds of the protection of industrial and commercial property. In
the case of Article 36, however, it should be noted that the final paragraph states
that such prohibitions or restrictions shall not constitute a disguised restriction on
trade between member states. It was therefore confidently predicted by some writers
that, since -the Treaty left intact the existing system of national recognition of indus-
trial property rights, a proprietor of such rights was free to exercise them without
attack under Article 85 or 86 so long as he did not attempt to impose restrictions
which were outside the scope of the monopoly created by the industrial property
right concerned. Thus, a patentee who had registered his patent in France and
Germany was said to be entitled to enjoin his French licensee from exporting to
Germany if he relied simply on his German patent, but could not impose a con-
tractual restriction in -his French license to that effect, because such a restriction was
outside -the ambit of the monopoly created by the French patent.
Over the last ten years, these prophets have been shown to be wrong, at least in
part. I would like to illustrate this by reference to three of the leading cases which
have been heard before the European Court of Justice.
The first case is that which concerns The Grundig Company" and which related
to an exclusive distributorship arrangement made between' Grundig and a French
company, Rtablissements Consten. The agreement provided, inter alia, that Consten
would not make deliveries of products purchased from Grundig to any country ex-
cept France. Grundig allowed Consten to register in France the trademark GINT,
standing for Grundig International, Grundig being the proprietor of the Berne
" Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 1 CC Co.r. MKT.
Rai . 1- 5449, 298 U.N.T.S. 14-94 [known as the Rome Treaty].
"' tablissments Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. E.E.C. Comm'n, x2 Recuell de Ia Juris-
prudince de Ia Cour 429 [hereinafter Recuell de Ia Cour] [Court Decisions 196x-x966 Transfer Binder],
CCH Comm. MkT. REP. 8046 (r966).
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Deposit of this mark under the Paris Convention' for the Protection of Industrial
Property. Consten agreed to assign the GINT trademark in France to Grundig if
the exclusive distributorship arrangement were cancelled or terminated by effluxion
of time. Another French company, Unef, purchased Grundig equipment from Ger-
man dealers and resold it on the French market. Consten sued Unef on the grounds
of unfair competition, in that Unef was knowingly encroaching on Consten's ex-
clusive rights under its agreement with Gruntlig, and for infringement of the GINT
trademark. The Paris Court of Appeals suspended proceedings pending the de-
cision of the EEC Commission on the application made to it by Unef that the
Consten/Grundig agreement was in breach of Article 85. The Commission's
finding that the agreement was in breach of Article 85 was appealed to the Court
of Justice. The Court held that the GINT trademark, although validly registered
in France in the name of Consten, could not be used by its proprietor to restrict
imports into France of Grundig products by competitors. In effect, the Commission
and the Court stated that trademark rights may not be exercised in such a manner
as to prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the Common Market so as to
affect trade among the member states.
It should perhaps be noted that both the Commission and the Court could have
come to the same decision in the Grundig/Consten case on somewhat different
grounds than those on which they justified their findings. A trademark is used
to denote a connection in the course of trade between the proprietor and the goods
to which it is applied. The products in question already bore the GRUNDIG trade-
mark denoting the connection between the manufacturer and the products. The
GINT trademark, which was in any event applied in such a manner as to be
virtually invisible to the purchasing public, could only have denoted a connection
in the course of trade between a vendor and the product, showing to the public
that the vendor-proprietor of the mark had exercised his selective capacities in
choosing to place such products on the market under his mark. In fact, Consten
had exercised no such selective capacities in relation' to the products, because it was
precluded under its agreement with Grundig from selling any competing product:
There are, therefore, arguments in support of the proposition that the GINT trade-
mark was never used as a trademark but simply as a means of preventing competitive
imports into France. Therefore, Consten should not be entitled to rely on the argu-
ment that this use of the GINT trademark was a valid exercise of industrial property
rights. In other words, it was not a valid exercise of industrial property rights as
envisaged by Article 222 and Article 36 of the Treaty. Unfortunately, it was not
the reason given either by the Commission or by the Court in coming to its decision.
The second case is the Deutsche Grammophon1 case which concerned records
made by the Deutsche Grammophon Company in Germany and sold to its French
subsidiary, Polydor. Some of these records found their way back onto the German
"
1 Deutsche Gramnmophon v. Metro-Sp-Grossnrkte, Case No. 78/7o (Cour de Justice, justice de la
Communite europtene, June 8, 1971), 2 CCH Cozw. MrT. REP. 8io6.
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market and were resold by another German company called Metro-Grossmairkte at
prices substantially below the prices required by Deutsche Grammophon. The
Deutsche Grammophon price under its resale price maintenance system was 19 D.M.
whereas Metro was offering reimported records at approximately 12 D.M. Under
German copyright law, Deutsche Grammophon' was entitled to exclusive copyright in
records which it had produced and it sought to obtain an injunction restraining
Metro from reimporting and selling those records. The Court ruled that Deutsche
Grammophon could not exercise this right because in the circumstances it would be
contrary to the rules providing for the free movement of goods within' the Common
Market.
The third case is the Sirend2 case which involved the PREP trademark used
on cosmetics. The Sirena Company acquired the PREP trademark from the U.S.
company, Mark Allen, in 1937 and had enjoyed the continuous and exclusive use
of the trademark in Italy since that date. A company called Novimpex imported
into Italy from Germany products manufactured under license from Mark Allen,
the owner of the formula for the preparation of the cosmetics and of the trade-
mark in Germany. The Sirena price for the product was 5o0 Lire per jar whereas
the Novimpex price for the same product imported from Germany was 250 Lire
per jar. It was held by the Court of justice that Article 85 applied to prohibit
Sirena from relying on its rights in the PREP trademark to prohibit imports into
Italy from another member state, as Sirena had acquired the mark or the right to
use it under agreement with a former proprietor who had made a parallel assignment
of the mark in other member states, and that where, as in this case, the agreement
in question was entered into prior to the date on which the EEC Treaty came into
force, it could still constitute a breach of Article 85 if the effects of the agreement
were still felt in the Common' Market after such date.By way of contrast, I would now turn to the Parke Davis23 case in which
the proprietors of a Dutch patent covering certain medical products were held en-
titled* to prohibit imports from Italy of products which infringed upon the patent
even though no patent existed covering the manufacture or sale of the product in the
country of manufacture and the price offered by the Italian manufacturer on the
Dutch market was substantially below the price at which the proprietor of the
patent was selling the competing product. The case is interesting because the
Court concluded that the exercise by a patentee of his rights to prohibit infringing
imports did not amount to an abuse of a dominant position in Article 86 of the
Rome Treaty every though it resulted in the maintenance of a substantially higher
price for the product in the member state concerned than would have obtained if
the competing product had been allowed in.
How does one distinguish the Consten, Deutsche Grammophon, and Sirena
"2 Sirena S.r.. v. Eda GnbH, z7 Recueil de la Cour 69, 2 CCH Comm. MKT. R p. Sior (1971).
2'3 Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, Reese, Beintema-Interpharm, & Centrafarm Cos., 14 Recueil de la
Cour 81 [Court Decisions 1967.97o Tgnsfr" Binder] CCH Cosmm. MKiT. RE. 8054 (z968).
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cases from the Parke Davis decision? It should be noted that in the first three cases
a connection existed between the proprietor of the industrial property rights sought
to be enforced and other persons involved who were the source, whether immediate
or ultimate, of the goods, the sale of which was the subject of the claim for an injunc-
tion. In the Grundig case, the connection was between' Consten, the would-be pro-
hibitor of the imports, and Grundig, the manufacturer; in the Deutsche Grammophon
case the connection was between Deutsche Grammophon and its subsidiary, Polydor,
from whom indirectly the reimported records were obtained. In the Sirena case,
the connection was between Sirena and the Mark Allen Company under the 1937
Agreement, and Mark Allen was the proprietor of the formula and trademark in
Germany under which the competing products were manufactured and sold in Italy.
In the Parke Davis case, no such connection existed between Parke Davis, the
patentee, and the goods imported from Italy, or the person selling them on the
Dutch market, or those who had manufactured them in Italy. It is interesting to
observe, however, that, according to a rumor which gained some currency after the
Parke Davis case was heard, Parke Davis had in fact imparted know-how to the
Italian manufacturer in respect of the products which eventually found their way on-
to the Dutch market under a royalty arrangement, although this was never mentioned
in the hearing before the Court of Justice.
In considering the question of the interaction between antitrust rules and in-
dustrial property rights in the Common Market, mention should perhaps be made
of the so-called Koch-Froschmaier doctrine which was formulated in an article
published in io65.  Messrs. Koch and Froschmaier were both officials in the
Directorate of Competition in the Brussels Commission at the time. Their theory
was that since one of the fundamental principles of the EEC Treaty was to build
up an economic system of undistorted competition within an' integrated market,
once a patented product had been put on the market in one of the member states
either by a patentee or his licensee, the product could then be freely sold in any
other member state notwithstanding the existence of a parallel patent vested in
the same patentee. It should be observed that the Koch-Froschmaier doctrine could
not have been applied to reverse the decision in the Parke Davis case, since no
parallel patent existed in Italy from which the Dutch patentee had already derived
an advantage, either directly or through his licensee.
So far as mergers are concerned it should be noted that the provisions of U.K.
law relating to these which I have described are very much more detailed than any
contained in the Rome Treaty. In fact, there is no specific reference in the Rome
Treaty to mergers and acquisitions. There is no requirement for a priori approval
to mergers in the Rome Treaty such as that which is contained in the U.K.
Monopolies and Mergers Act of 1965. At one point, the Brussels Commission ob-
viously had under consideration the possibility of applying Article 85 to restrict
"Koch & Froschmaier, Doctrine of Territoriality in Patent Law and the European Common Market,
9 IDA 343 (Summer, 1965).
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mergers which they thought would reduce competition. When the Agfa-Gevaert
merger took place, the Commission approached the two companies concerned with
a request for particulars on the assumption that Article 85 was applicable to this
situation. However, after the appointment and report of a Professorial Committee
to advise the Commission on its powers under Article 85 in respect of mergers, it
was at length acknowledged that the Article would not apply to the act of merger
itself, although in some circumstances it could apply to subsequent agreements and
arrangements between the parties involved. Article 86 has, however, been applied
by the Commission in two cases. The first concerned the German firm GEMA
which deals in' copyrights of musical works. The Commission has found that GEMA
has a dominant position in a substantial part of the Common Market and that it
has abused such position by discriminating against nationals of member states
other than Germany, by imposing unfair conditions on its own members by pre-
venting the establishment of a single market for music publishers, and by exploiting
its copyright position to impose unfair conditions on German record manufacturers
and on German importers of tape recorders?6' We now have the fascinating Con-
tinental Can26 decision which was recently promulgated by the Commission in' which
the acquisition by Continental Can of a competitor is claimed by the Commission to
constitute an abuse of a dominant position under Article 86 and a breach of the
Treaty provisions. The decision is under appeal to the Court of Justice but there
have been recent hints that Continental Can may agree to divest itself of some of
its manufacturing operations in the Common Market if the Commission will accept
such divestiture in' settlement of the case. In one sense, it will be a considerable dis-
appointment to the student of antitrust law in the Common Market if the case is
settled on this basis, since there is very widespread interest in knowing which way
the Court of Justice would decide on the facts of the Continental Can case. One most
interesting feature of the case is the claim made by the Commission that the mere
reduction of competition by acquiring a competitor can be an abuse of a dominant
position. Another interesting feature is the definition which the Commission has
laid down of what constitutes a dominant position, namely, the ability of an enter-
prise to disregard competitors, buyers or suppliers, or to determine prices, or to con-
trol production or distribution of a substantial proportion of the relevant goods.
The finding of the Commission as to what may constitute an abuse is in' fact in
direct contradiction to the conclusions of the Berkhouwer Report to the European
Parliament, which stated that an enterprise which enjoys a dominant position and
which absorbs another enterprise in the same field does not thereby infringe the
provisions of Article 86. In fact, it was partly because of this conclusion that the
Report recommended the adoption of a system of prior notification in the case of
mergers and the grant of authority to the Commission to prevent a merger which
"'Re GEMA, 2 CCH Commv. MKT. REP 9438 (197).
'a Continental Can, 2 CCH Com.rf. MT. REP. 9481 (1971).
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would result in control of more than twenty per cent of the relevant market passing
into the hands of one enterprise.
II
THE IMPAcr ON COMPANY LAw
I would like to say a few words about the legal implications of British entry into
the Common Market so far as concerns the field of company law. In this connec-
tiorn, I hope you will not consider that I am being chauvinistic if I emphasize
two facts concerning companies and company law in the United Kingdom. The
first is that the possible impact of Community law on British companies is a matter
of utmost concern to the United Kingdom simply because there are far more com-
panies in the U.K. than in the whole of the rest of the Common Market. There
were well over half a million companies on the Register in i971. The U.K. has more
quoted companies than the other members of the Common Market combined. There
were 3,3oo quoted companies in the U.K. on December 3, i971, whereas there were
only 2,5oo in Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg together.
The market capitalization of U.K. quoted companies on December 3, 1971, was
5o.2 thousand million pounds compared with 34.7 thousand million pounds in the
six member states of the Common Market. The U.K. has a far greater capital
market than any that exists in the rest of Europe.
The second point I would like to make is that company law in the U.K., where
the joint stock company originated, is in my view more flexible than any other system
of company law in the Common Market, or indeed in Europe. For instance, there
are no requirements as to nationality of shareholders or officers of a U.K. company.
There are no requirements as to minimum capital, or as to the ratio between debt
and equity capital. There are no rules as to workers' participation in management.
Although there are very full and detailed requirements as to the form and content
of Prospectuses and Offer documents, which are of course essential from the point
of view of protection of the purchasing public, there is no such body as the SEC,
although there is a self-regulatory body known as the Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers which is responsible for enforcement of the City Code on Takeovers and
Mergers and which has as its ultimate sanction the power to deprive an offender of
his ability to enjoy the facilities of the securities market.
The development of common rules for company law in the Common Market has
not yet reached its final stage, but the development of ideas for the adoption of
common rules in the Common Market has indeed done so. It is this which is
causing some disquiet amongst bodies such as the Confederation of British Industries
and professional advisers in the company field, including both lawyers and accoun-
tants. There is a fear that harmonization of company law in the EEC will take a
form which would necessitate the reform of U.K. company law in a manner far
from acceptable to the majority of the industrial and commercial community. Thus,
for instance, we may be faced with acceptance of the Continental system of two-tier
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boards, one a board of management and the other a supervisory board. We may have
to accept employee participation in management on the German worker-directors
model.2T We may have to enact legislation requiring companies to have minimum
share capitals in an amount exceeding the share capital of some seventy per cent
of the U.K. companies now in existence. We may have to accept bearer shares for
companies despite the objections from the taxation and exchange control points of
view. We may be faced with accounting and reporting requirements which are
different both as regards presentation and content from present U.K. practice.
The free and competitive approach to mergers which prevails in the U.K. may have
to be amended and restricted.
These fears are so real and immediate that the Council of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants has issued a public statement drawing attention to the
dangers that exist if the code of company law in the Community develops in too
rigid a fashion. It is stressed that the proposals made by the Commission are not
necessarily wrong in principle insofar as they depart from U.K. practice but that
they should be subjected to full review and further consideration in the light of the
circumstances and needs of the new member states before they become law.
IV
Ti CVIL LAw BOGEY
Much has been said, particularly by the anti-marketeers, of the effect of British
entry into the EEC on what is usually described in emotive tones as "the heritage
of the Common Law." Speeches have been made and articles written' in which
it is implied, if not stated specifically, that entry into the Common Market by the
United Kingdom will mean that the Magna Carta might just as well not have
been signed, the Bill of Rights enacted, or the Writ of Habeas Corpus evolved.
This is nonsense, of course. So is the suggestion that we will all soon' be living
under the Napoleonic Code. It is sometimes forgotten that a large portion of the
United Kingdom is in fact a Civil Law country, namely, Scotland. Moreover, Com-
munity law will have virtually no impact on large areas of the law, particularly
those which most affect the individual, such as family law. In fact, where Com-
munity law will have most impact is in branches of the law which have developed
comparatively recently to meet the needs of modern business communities, such as
company law, patent law, transport, communications, and antitrust. In these
branches, differences between Civil Law and Common Law are comparatively slight,
because the needs of modern' business communities do not differ greatly.
" Suggestions from the Brussels Commission already indicate the likelihood of such action. Without
uniformity throughout the Common Market on worker-directors, countries where they are required might
find their investors transferring to countries where participation by workers in management is not
mandatory. Such an unequal investment situation is not acceptable under EEC regulations. It is doubtful
that Germany and Holland will relinquish their worker-director policies. Consequently, the other states
may have to adopt the German model.
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It must, however, be accepted that Continental statutes tend to be drafted in
broad terms to emphasize points of principle as opposed to matters of detail,
whereas enactments of the British Parliament strive to achieve great precision of
language and to cover points of detail as well as of principle. Whether they always
succeed is another matter. It is also true that the structure of the three Com-
munity Treaties differs from that of U.K. statutes in that they are drafted in more
veneral terms and therefore leave more scope for judicial interpretation. However,
it is felt that there are three reasons why the difference in construction between the
Treaties and existing U.K. legislation will be unlikely to cause any great difficulty.
First, the Treaty provisions must meet the test of clarity before they can have direct
internal effect in the member states, according to the European 'Court of justice.
Secondly, the U.K. courts will be concerned more with regulations issued by the
Commission than with the Treaties themselves, and the regulations are drafted in
greater detail and with greater precision. Lastly, regulations, directives, and decisions
of the Commission must be fully reasoned and must contain preambles referring to
any proposals or opinions which the Treaties require to be obtained before their
promulgation and may be interpreted in the light of these preambles.
Finally, it must be recognized that the interaction between Community law and
English law will not be only one way. English lawyers will soon be taking part in
the framing of Community regulations, directives, and decisions and these will have
to pay regard to English law relating to techniques of construction. English judges
will be appointed to the Court of Justice, and the U.K. will appoint one of the three
Advocates-General of the Court. Each system will be bound to have some effect on
the other, and it is hoped for the benefit of both.
